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INTRODUCTION 
One of the core tenets of democratic government is that We the People 
should have a voice in decisions that affect us collectively. Yet, given the size 
and scope of modern society, it will rarely be feasible for all of us to 
participate directly in the policymaking process. Instead, we participate via 
political representatives. It is through representation that the people are made 
“present” in government, and generations of political theorists have sought 
to make sense of the relationship between representation and democracy.1 
The standard account of political representation emphasizes three 
features that serve to legitimize and democratize representation: 
Representatives must be authorized to act on the people’s behalf; there must 
 
† Robert G. Seaks LL.B. ‘34 Professor of Law, Duke University. Thanks to Rick Bierschbach, 
Steve Burbank, David Marcus, Max Minzner, Alex Reinert, Kevin Stack, and seminar participants 
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1 HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 8-9 (1967). 
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be some means by which the people can hold their representatives accountable 
for their actions; and the representatives must in fact endeavor to advance the 
people’s interests.2 The precise meaning of the last condition is the subject of one 
of the longest-running debates in political theory. Some commentators argue 
that representatives ought to serve as delegates for the people, channeling their 
constituents’ wishes into action. Others envision representatives as enlightened 
and largely independent trustees who follow their own autonomous judgment 
about how best to promote their constituents’ interests.3 Where a particular 
representative sits on the spectrum from “instructed delegate” to “enlightened 
trustee” has important consequences for the representative relationship, and—
for some theorists—for the legitimacy of representation.4 
Most theories of political representation focus on legislative bodies as 
centers of policymaking authority and, thus, key sites for representation. But 
policymaking in the United States is by no means confined to the legislative 
branch. Of particular relevance here, our legal system also depends heavily 
on courts and litigants to develop and enforce the law through case-by-case 
adjudications.5 The reality that adjudication involves more than mechanical 
law application is most obvious in common law cases, but the point extends 
to many instances in which courts are called upon to interpret statutes and 
constitutional provisions.6 And, because “[c]ourts are not self-starting,”7 the 
choices made by litigants and lawyers—which may be driven by considerations 
of strategy, resources, values, and more—play a vital role in shaping how the 
law operates in practice. 
Representation is critical to adjudication, though at first glance the link 
to political representation may seem to be little more than semantic 
coincidence. If the prototypical political representative is an elected official 
who represents a multitude of citizens, the standard model of adjudicative 
 
2 Andrew Rehfield, Towards a General Theory of Political Representation, 68 J. POL. 1, 3 (2006). 
3 See Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515, 516 (2003) (“In 
the ‘mandate’ version of the model, the representative promises to follow the constituents’ 
instructions or expressed desires; in the ‘trustee’ version the representative promises to further the 
constituency’s long-run interests and the interests of the nation as a whole.”). 
4 See, e.g., PITKIN, supra note 1, at 145 (describing this as “the central classic controversy in the 
literature of political representation”); Andrew Rehfield, Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, 
and Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation and Democracy, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 214, 214 
(2009) (“[I]n representative government, the central normative problem of democracy is often restated 
in terms of the relationship between citizens and their representatives: how closely must a 
representative’s votes on legislation correspond to the preferences and will of his or her constituents?”). 
5 See generally SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND 
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010). 
6 See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 422-34 (2008) (discussing judicial policymaking and 
the influence of the Realists). 
7 Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21, 21 (1996). 
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representation is that of a single attorney representing a single client. The 
reasons for representation also appear to shift when we move from the 
political to the adjudicative context. Clients rely on attorneys to speak for 
them in adjudication, not because it is impossible for them to participate more 
directly, but because they wish to take advantage of attorneys’ specialized 
legal training. 
These differences reflect the distinctive norms that govern participation 
in adjudication and lawmaking. The norms of adjudication are individualistic, 
focused on litigant autonomy and captured in the ideal that every disputant 
is entitled to his own “day in court.”8 That ideal, in turn, is formalized in due 
process rights of notice and an opportunity to be heard.9 But those rights do 
not apply in the context of regulatory or legislative decisions of more general 
applicability. As the Court explained in the famous Bi-Metallic case, 
[w]here a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is impracticable 
that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption . . . . Their rights are 
protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, 
immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.10 
Despite these differences, the worlds of lawmaking and adjudication are 
closer than they first appear. As many others have observed, the lines between 
lawmaking and adjudication are blurry at best.11 Statutes and regulations may be 
narrowly drawn, targeting identifiable individuals and groups.12 And, given rules 
of preclusion and stare decisis, the results of adjudication may have wide-ranging, 
prospective effects.13 
This familiar point about the overlap between lawmaking and adjudication 
also has ramifications for representation. To borrow the language of Bi-Metallic, 
adjudication can and often does establish “rule[s] of conduct” that apply to 
“more than a few people”—sometimes many more. That point is self-evident in 
 
8 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989). 
9 See, e.g., Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918) (“[A]s a State may not, 
consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, enforce a judgment against a party named in the 
proceedings without a hearing or an opportunity to be heard, so it cannot, without disregarding the 
requirement of due process, give a conclusive effect to a prior judgment against one who is neither 
a party nor in privity with a party therein.”). 
10 Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). 
11 See, e.g., JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN 
THE UNITED STATES 16-21 (1927) (problematizing the lawmaking/adjudication divide); Ralph F. 
Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L. REV. 259, 260-65 (1938) (same). 
12 See Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 640-47, 688-94 
(2014) (discussing problems with “special legislation” and proposing a requirement of legislative 
generality). 
13 See Lemos, supra note 6, at 439-40 & n.165 (“Although a judicial decision may technically 
apply to the parties to the case, the fact remains that unless and until the relevant court changes the 
relevant rule, the rule stands.”). 
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class actions and other forms of aggregate litigation in which the interests being 
adjudicated are themselves quite numerous.14 Indeed, a primary purpose of the 
class-action device is to facilitate litigation in circumstances where it is 
inefficient or impossible for all the affected individuals to sue one by one. But 
even cases with a single plaintiff and a single defendant can have serious 
consequences for third parties, particularly where the goal of the suit is to 
change institutional conduct or establish a new rule of law. 
In these circumstances, the conventional model of adjudicative 
representation—one attorney, one client—seems inaccurate, or at least 
inadequate. Meanwhile, the questions that have animated theories of political 
representation come to the forefront. How can diverse and sometimes 
conflicting interests be represented by a single person? How might 
representatives be authorized and held accountable, and what should we do 
when they are not? Should representatives behave like delegates or trustees? 
To be sure, lawyers and legal academics talk about these questions, 
particularly in the context of class actions. Too often, though, the 
conversation is confined to the silo of law, ignoring that theorists from other 
disciplines have studied the same questions for generations.15 
In this Article, I use the lens of political theory to examine the concepts 
of adjudicative representation in different types of litigation settings. My use 
of the plural is intentional. Our legal system employs multiple models of 
representation, and my principal goal is to survey the litigation landscape to 
take account of the diversity of adjudicative representation. Given limitations 
of space, the survey is necessarily truncated. First, I focus only on attorneys as 
representatives, though there is much that could be said about representative 
parties. Second, I consider only three adjudicative settings: individual suits, 
civil suits by government, and private class actions. Because the potential for 
overlap between adjudicative and political representation is at its peak in 
areas where adjudication touches on contested questions of social policy, most 
of the discussion that follows concerns public law litigation.16 In the class 
action context, for example, I focus on injunctive class actions, which tend to 
be spearheaded by public interest lawyers. 
 
14 See, e.g., Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part II: Interest, Class, and 
Representation, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1071 (1980) (“In group litigation the theory of representation 
. . . permits, in theory, a lawsuit involving . . . ‘the multitude’ to go forward because what would 
otherwise be an impracticably large number of people is represented by the active litigant . . . .”). 
15 Cf. Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1193 (1982) 
(“By contrast to political theory, which suffers from an ‘embarrassment of riches’ in defining, if not 
resolving, problems of representation, judicial analysis is impoverished in both concept and 
application. Most notably, the perennial debate over how much paternalism a representative is 
entitled to exercise receives almost no attention in reported cases.”). 
16 See David Marcus, The Short Life and Long Afterlife of the Mass Tort Class Action, 165 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1571=72 (2017) (describing the public law model of adjudication). 
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Even with these limitations, the survey reveals three distinct models of 
adjudicative representation, each of which presents different challenges and 
produces different consequences for the immediate litigants and third parties. 
As political theorists long have recognized, no system of representation is 
perfect; “the suppression of differences is a problem for all representation.”17 
But different types of representation include and exclude—empower and 
disempower—in different ways. As I suggest in a brief conclusion, recognizing 
this diversity in adjudicative representation might open up fruitful lines of 
inquiry into the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each model, and 
a better understanding of where each model is most, and least, desirable. 
I. THE INDIVIDUAL MODEL: ONE ATTORNEY, ONE CLIENT 
The conventional vision of adjudicative representation features an 
individual attorney representing an individual client. The same vision 
permeates the rules of professional conduct for attorneys, most of which 
“simply assume that the client is an individual.”18 In this vision, the attorney 
acts as an agent of the client. The client relies on the attorney for legal 
expertise, but the client is in charge: her preferences as to the “objectives of 
representation” control, even if the attorney believes them to be unwise.19 I 
will call this the “individual model” of adjudicative representation. 
If we compare this model to the standard account of political 
representation, we find both similarities and differences. Recall that the 
orthodox view of political representation stresses three elements: 
authorization, accountability, and interest representation. As described 
below, the first two elements become problematic when we move away from 
conventional lawyer–client arrangements and into larger-scale litigation in 
which an individual attorney represents many people at once. But in the 
simple case of one attorney and one client, the requirements of 
authorization and accountability are straightforward as a conceptual matter. 
It is with respect to the third element of representation—the 
requirement that the representative act for the represented, promoting her 
interests—that the individual model of adjudicative representation diverges 
from most theories of political representation. As the Introduction 
suggested, the verb form of “represent” raises thorny questions about what 
 
17 Suzanne Dovi, Political Representation, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/political-
representation/ [https://perma.cc/QRS5-4ZFS]. 
18 Ann Southworth, Collective Representation for the Disadvantaged: Variations in Problems of 
Accountability, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449, 2452 (1998). 
19 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“[A] lawyer shall abide 
by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the 
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”). 
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it means for one person to represent the interests of another, and to do so 
well or badly. Should the representative follow the wishes of her 
constituents? Or should she exercise autonomous judgment in service of her 
constituents’ welfare? In the conventional attorney–client relationship, the 
answer seems clear enough: the attorney must follow the client’s mandate. 
The attorney, in other words, acts as an “instructed delegate” rather than an 
“enlightened trustee.” Some theorists conceive of political representation in 
the same way, but the question is hotly contested. And, it seems safe to say, 
the “delegate” view is a minority position in political theory.20 
This aspect of the individual model of adjudicative representation reflects, 
and reinforces, the “strongly individualistic system of litigation” in the United 
States.21 It also suggests something interesting about how our system 
conceives of legal entitlements. In her famous book, The Concept of 
Representation, Hannah Pitkin argued that resolution of the delegate vs. trustee 
question depends on a constellation of considerations, including the relative 
capacity of representative and represented as well as the kinds of issues with 
which the representative will have to deal.22 Perhaps most importantly for 
present purposes, Pitkin reasoned that the “delegate” approach will tend to be 
correlated with an understanding of interests as personal and subjective, while 
the “trustee” approach will seem more appropriate in contexts where the 
relevant interests are conceived in objective terms: 
The more [one] sees interests . . . as objective, as determinable by people other 
than the one whose interest it is, the more possible it becomes for a representative 
to further the interest of his constituents without consulting their wishes . . . . In 
contrast, the more [one] sees interests, wants, and the like as definable only by 
 
20 See, e.g., BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 163 
(1997) (“Representative systems do not authorize (indeed explicitly prohibit) two practices that 
would deprive representatives of any kind of independence: imperative mandates and discretionary 
revocability of representatives (recall).”); Rehfield, supra note 4, at 214 (“No one expects there to 
be an exact correspondence between [the laws of a nation and the preferences of the citizens 
governed by them] . . . . As long as . . . deviations do not become the norm (in which the law 
routinely fails to correspond to citizen preferences), they fit well within broad conceptions of 
democracy.”); Nadia Urbinati & Mark E. Warren, The Concept of Representation in Contemporary 
Democratic Theory, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 387, 398 (2008) (“Elections establish the 
nonindependence of the representative from the represented in principle, although in practice, 
representative institutions require enough autonomy to carry out their political functions, which 
will require bodies that can engage in deliberative political judgments.”); see also infra notes 51-53 
and accompanying text (describing Pitkin’s view). 
21 Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 48; see 
also, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and 
Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1652 (1996) (noting that the “day in court” 
ideal seems to entail “the client having ‘control’ of the litigation”). 
22 See Pitkin, supra note 1, at 210-12. 
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the person who feels or has them, the more likely he is to require that a 
representative consult his constituents and act in response to what they ask him.23 
On this view, the individual model makes sense if we think about 
adjudicative choices—whether to sue (or defend) in the first place, what 
remedies to seek (or oppose), whether to settle or press on to trial, and so on—
as inherently personal choices rather than decisions that can be said to be 
objectively right or wrong. That perspective is certainly plausible. Take the 
facts of Taxman v. Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway,24 a case I 
will refer to throughout this Article for purposes of illustration and discussion. 
Budget pressures force a public high school to make layoffs, and the choice 
comes down to two teachers of equal seniority. One teacher, Sharon Taxman, 
is white. The other, Debra Williams, is black. Williams is the only minority 
teacher in her department. The school’s affirmative action policy provides that, 
when two or more equally qualified candidates are competing for a position, 
racial minorities “will be recommended.” After concluding that Taxman and 
Williams are equally qualified, the school board invokes the affirmative action 
policy and votes to terminate Taxman’s employment. 
Here, the board’s decision and the role that race played in that decision 
are matters of objective fact. Whether it is “worth it” for Taxman to sue is, at 
least arguably, something that only she can decide. This point is not just about 
time, money, and a taste for conflict; it is also—in its strong form—about 
values. Taxman’s attorney can help her understand the legal claims available 
to her, but only she can decide what to do with that advice. Only she can 
decide whether her layoff pursuant to the affirmative action policy was a 
wrong, on whatever terms she thinks are relevant. That, at least, is the 
perspective suggested by the individual model of adjudicative representation. 
This understanding of adjudicative representation suggests that we can 
identify challenges for representation in instances where client autonomy 
appears to be at risk—where the attorney, not the client, is calling the shots.25 
Similar challenges can arise when an attorney endeavors to advance interests 
different from those of the immediate client. For example, Sarah 
Weddington, the attorney for Norma McCorvey—the woman behind the 
pseudonym “Jane Roe” in Roe v. Wade—reportedly understood herself as “a 
 
23 Id. at 210. 
24 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996). 
25 See, e.g., Deborah Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 
89, 92-97 (surveying empirical data suggesting that attorneys normally control lawsuits in non-class 
tort cases, in part because such cases were often aggregated together informally); Southworth, supra 
note 18, at 2460 & n.53 (concluding that “[t]he influential role of lawyers for individuals in this study 
is consistent with other empirical evidence demonstrating that lawyers typically exercise substantial 
control in service to poor individuals and in ‘personal plight’ practice,” and collecting sources). 
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pathbreaking representative for a broad female constituency.”26 To her, the 
name Jane Roe “represented all women, not just one.”27 That outlook shaped 
Weddington’s litigation choices. In the initial meeting between the two 
women, McCorvey told Weddington that her pregnancy resulted from rape. 
The operative state law made no exception for rape, though many other state 
laws had been reformed to decriminalize abortion in cases of rape or incest. 
Thus, a seemingly promising approach to the case would have been to 
challenge the law on relatively narrow grounds related to rape. But 
Weddington favored a more ambitious “abolition” strategy that sought 
complete repeal of criminal abortion laws. She later explained that “we did 
not want the Texas law changed only to allow abortion in cases of rape. We 
wanted a decision that abortion was covered by the right of privacy. . . . Our 
principles were not based on how conception occurred.”28 
Such an approach is hard to square with the individual model of 
adjudicative representation, which gives primacy to the interests of the client. 
As one critic put it: 
To whom is Weddington referring when she uses the words ‘we’ and ‘our’? She 
might simply mean the lawyers, herself and [co-counsel]. Or she might be 
referring to the lawyers’ broader constituency, supporters of the abortion rights 
cause. . . . In either case, the assumption underlying this reference to the desires 
and principles of the lawyers or their constituency as a justification for rejection 
of the rape allegation is at odds with basic conflict of interest norms governing 
lawyers. Neither the interests of the lawyer nor the interests of third parties are 
permitted to influence the judgment of a lawyer in representing a client. 
Rather, only the interests of the client are to guide the lawyer.29 
As this critique suggests, a consequence of the individual model is the 
exclusion of third-party interests. We all know that individual cases can have 
significant consequences for individuals and groups who are not involved in 
the litigation but are nevertheless affected by it. To be sure, third parties will 
not be formally bound by the results; they remain free to have their own day 
in court if they wish.30 But, given the operation of precedent, that day will 
likely be short and not very sweet.31 
 
26 Kevin C. McMunigal, Of Causes and Clients: Two Tales of Roe v. Wade, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 
779, 783 (1995) (discussing SARAH WEDDINGTON, A QUESTION OF CHOICE (1992)). 
27 Id. at 800 (quoting WEDDINGTON, supra note 26, at 54). 
28 Id. at 794 (quoting WEDDINGTON, supra note 26, at 52-53). 
29 Id. at 798. 
30 See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892, 894 (2008) (reiterating “the general rule that 
one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party 
or to which he has not been made a party by service of process” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
31 See Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 1647 (“The only difference between . . . precedential effect 
and pure preclusion is that the later plaintiffs can literally have their day—albeit a short one—in 
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Consider the Taxman case again. Suppose Taxman sues in federal court to 
challenge the school board’s affirmative action policy as a form of racial 
discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Suppose she wins. And suppose that the case presents an as-yet unresolved 
question: whether, and under what circumstances, a desire for diversity is a 
permissible justification for a racial preference under Title VII. At the very 
least, the decision in Taxman’s case will affect the affirmative action policy in 
Piscataway, with concrete consequences for various individuals who might have 
been advantaged or disadvantaged by the operation of the policy. But the 
consequences will be broader than that, particularly if the trial court’s decision 
is appealed to the Third Circuit. Because courts do not lightly overturn 
statutory precedents,32 it is a good bet that any decision by the Third Circuit 
will shape affirmative action policies in the mid-Atlantic region for years to 
come. Obviously, the effects will be even more extensive if the case goes all the 
way up to the Supreme Court. Under the individual model of adjudicative 
representation, Taxman’s attorney has no obligation to consider those larger 
ramifications of the suit, nor to take into account the third-party interests that 
might be at stake. Such inattention to third-party interests is not a failure of 
representation under the individual model, but an all-but-inevitable 
consequence of it.33 
To some observers, this is a bug in our litigation system. It means that 
private litigants and lawyers have the capacity to shape policy for the rest of 
us, but without any authorization, accountability, or assurance that our 
interests will be protected—in short, without any representation.34 In a 
democracy, that result may be hard to swallow. 
 
court. In practice, the outcome of [individual] lawsuits did harm (or benefit) others within their 
community.”); accord Rhode, supra note 15, at 1197 (“[G]iven the force of stare decisis, the practical 
consequences for unrepresented constituencies are often the same, whether or not they are part of a 
certified class.”). 
32 See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 317, 317 (2005) (“The Supreme Court has long given its cases interpreting statutes special 
protection from overruling.”). 
33 For a critique of this model, at least as applied to litigation-framing decisions in 
acknowledged “test case[s] meant to make law for the entire community,” see Rubenstein, supra note 
21, at 1652-53 (“A more robust vision of client loyalty in this circumstance would ask the litigator to 
acknowledge her larger client—the community—and thus to consider the consequences of her tactics 
on the community’s interests”); see also, e.g., JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 267-69 (1976) (describing how civil rights lawyers 
wrestled with “whether their client was, as traditional professional precepts dictated, a solitary party 
to a discrete case, or . . . a cause larger than any client”). 
34 See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A Suggested Perspective, 77 NW. 
U. L. REV. 492, 499-500 (1982) (observing that the accountability problems in class actions also 
plague individual actions brought by organizations in which plaintiffs seek broad injunctive relief). 
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One response might be that third parties are represented in a different 
way: via the political process that produced the laws that are being 
implemented and enforced through adjudication. On that view, a statute like 
Title VII creates a policy lever that any affected individual can pull. Having 
participated in the creation of the law, third parties have no right, based on 
democratic principles, to influence other individuals’ decisions to pull that 
lever. The important choices have already been made with their input; the 
law is the law.35 
This response has some force, but it lies in tension with the idea that legal 
entitlements implicate subjective, rather than objective, interests. The 
individual model of adjudicative representation leaves the decision to sue in 
the hands of each individual: no matter how strong the legal claim, Taxman’s 
attorney cannot initiate a suit on Taxman’s behalf unless Taxman herself wishes 
to take that step. As noted above, such an approach to representation makes 
sense if we understand the decision to pull the enforcement lever as a personal 
choice. But if we accept that view of legal entitlements, we cannot then treat 
the decision to sue as a given, or as legally preordained.36 Instead, we ought 
to acknowledge that other teachers in Taxman’s shoes might have foregone 
suit, or crafted their claims differently, or sought different remedies. We 
ought to be clear-eyed about the fact that those other teachers’ lives will be 
affected by the outcome of Taxman’s suit, and that Taxman’s attorney need 
not—indeed, must not37—attempt to represent their interests. 
II. THE POLITICAL MODEL: GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS 
REPRESENTING THE PUBLIC 
For those who are uncomfortable with the consequences of the individual 
model, one possible fix is to substitute one kind of attorney for another. 
Suppose that Taxman’s suit is initiated not by a private attorney retained by 
 
35 Cf. Yeazell, supra note 14, at 1115 (“If federal civil rights legislation proclaims it a violation of 
national policy to discriminate in education on the basis of sex, and an active litigant presents herself, 
alleging that she belongs to a definable group suffering from such discrimination, the court may feel 
itself hard pressed to deny that it is in the ‘interest’ of the group’s members to seek redress for such 
discrimination. National law has, in effect, proclaimed a national interest in eliminating such 
discrimination . . . .”). 
36 That is a big “if.” My goal here is not to defend the subjective understanding of legal 
entitlements, but to suggest that the individual model of adjudicative representation must rest on 
such an understanding. Professor Yeazell has argued that in circumstances such as Taxman’s “it is 
not a great leap of thought to conclude that the individual [plaintiff] is acting less to enforce a 
peculiarly private right than a public policy—a policy that should be enforced whether other 
similarly situated persons desire it or not.” Id. Maybe so, but it is hard to see why such logic should 
stop with “similarly situated persons.” If the public policy “should be enforced,” why not compel 
Taxman herself to sue—at least if legal representation can be secured for free? 
37 Absent informed consent of the client. 
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Taxman herself, but by government attorneys working in the Civil Rights 
Division of the federal Department of Justice. The crux of the claim is the 
same, but what was once a private suit has become a governmental one. With 
that change comes a shift in representation. The attorneys handling the case 
are no longer duty-bound to advocate on behalf of Sharon Taxman. Their 
client is now the United States and, by extension, the public.38 Their 
obligation is to promote the public interest, to “seek justice.”39 
This kind of litigation—civil suits by government attorneys seeking to 
enforce constitutional and statutory entitlements—is ubiquitous. Unlike 
individual adjudication, government litigation can take account of all of the 
affected interests, considering not just the private but also the social costs and 
benefits of the suit. Moreover, government attorneys can represent collective 
interests without clearing the various procedural hurdles that stand in the way of 
private class actions.40 At a time when many courts seem intent on raising those 
hurdles ever higher, the governmental alternative seems attractive indeed.41 
The model of adjudicative representation that prevails in these types of 
governmental actions differs in significant respects from the individual model 
described above. I will call this the “political model” of adjudicative representation, 
because the primary means of influence and control are political. Most government 
lawyers are part of organizational hierarchies that are headed by elected officials or 
their political appointees.42 Others, such as state attorneys general, are themselves 
elected officials.43 Whether directly or indirectly, elections serve to establish the 
 
38 Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” in Civil Litigation?, 9 WIDENER J. 
PUB. L. 235, 269 (2000) (“Whether one views the client as the government, a government agency 
or a government official, the client is distinctive in at least this respect: the client owes fiduciary 
duties to the public.”); William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why it 
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2138 (2004) (“Many public attorneys . . . consider ‘the public’ or 
‘the public interest’ as their real client in interest; the agency or government official to whom they 
report is simply an intermediary form of that principal.”). 
39 Green, supra note 38, at 238; see also Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, 
and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 789 (2000) (“It is an 
uncontroversial proposition in mainstream American legal thought that government lawyers have greater 
responsibilities to pursue the common good or the public interest than their counterparts in private 
practice . . . .”). 
40 See Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys 
General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 499-510 (2012) (comparing state attorney general suits with class actions). 
41 See, e.g., Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment and the States, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 30-34) (discussing “state public enforcement as a response to the 
Roberts Court’s curtailment of . . . private aggregate litigation”); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After 
Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 660 
(2012) (arguing that “state attorneys general . . . have the ability to fill the void left by class actions”). 
42 See Clopton, supra note 41, at 65. 
43 See Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and Independence for the 
Litigation State, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 29-41) (describing the 
institutional arrangements that structure government litigation). 
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requirements of authorization and accountability.44 But the relationship between 
representative and represented is far more attenuated in the context of 
governmental litigation than it is in the individual model. When an individual 
client is responsible for hiring and firing an attorney, her influence is both personal 
and immediate. She, and only she, is the client; the decisions are hers to make. In 
contrast, influence over a public official like a state attorney general is diffused 
among the states’ citizens. The preferences and actions of any one individual are 
unlikely to make much of a difference. Equally important, the representational 
relationship extends well beyond any one case, as the state attorney general 
discharges various responsibilities over a multi-year term. If I am unhappy with my 
state attorney general’s performance in a given case, I can hope to vote the bum out 
of office—but I may have to wait several years before I get that chance. 
The political model of adjudicative representation also differs from the 
individual model with respect to interest representation. I have argued 
elsewhere that government litigation ought to be understood in terms similar 
to those that Pitkin suggests for political representation.45 This means that 
government attorneys should be theorized as something in between instructed 
delegates and enlightened trustees. Those responsible for the government’s 
adjudicative choices should pay attention to the wishes of interested members 
of the public and should be prepared to justify their decisions to those 
individuals, but they need not be slaves to public desires if they believe that the 
public interest would be better served by a different course of action.46 
This approach is justified by the nature of affirmative government litigation. 
In part because of the breadth and ambiguity of many substantive legal 
commands, our legal system neither assumes nor encourages maximal 
enforcement. Instead, we depend on litigants—especially “public” litigants—to 
choose cases carefully and to ignore violations that fall outside the principal 
purposes of the law. As Justice Jackson wrote during his tenure as Attorney 
General, “[w]hat every prosecutor is practically required to do is to select the 
cases for prosecution and to select those in which the offense is the most flagrant, 
the public harm the greatest, and the proof the most certain.”47 Jackson was 
referring to prosecutorial discretion, but the necessity—and desirability—of 
 
44 Cf. RICHARD MULGAN, HOLDING POWER TO ACCOUNT: ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
MODERN DEMOCRACIES 31 (2003) (“Political accountability can . . . include accountability both 
within the executive branch to the president as well as to Congress and to sections of the public at 
large.”); see also Jeremy Waldron, Accountability: Fundamental to Democracy at 14 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. Of 
Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-13), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2410812 [https://perma.cc/UPG5-A8LE] (noting 
that “accountability in modern democracies is often mediated,” as where a civil servant answers to a 
supervisor who answers to an elected official, who in turn answers to voters). 
45 Lemos, supra note 43, at 46-50. 
46 Id. at 34-36. 
47 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 (1940). 
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discretion extends to the civil sphere as well. Such “discretionary 
nonenforcement”48 may not make law in a formal sense, but it profoundly 
shapes the way the law operates in practice. 
Understanding government litigation this way, as a form of discretionary 
policymaking, highlights the importance of measures that facilitate public 
input and dialogue about choices that have the potential to affect all of us. It 
highlights, in other words, the normative relevance of citizens’ preferences. 
It does not follow that the government’s litigation decisions should simply 
channel majority sentiment, however. In many cases, public opinion will be 
uninformed or misinformed. It may rest on false premises about the law or 
the conduct in question, or on considerations that the law deems irrelevant. 
Worse, public opinion may be based on inputs, such as racial bias, that the 
law affirmatively rejects. That risk is particularly stark when the law being 
enforced was designed to protect minority interests from majority will.49 
Similar concerns have led Pitkin and many other political theorists to reject 
the most extreme “mandate” or “delegate” view of political representation.50 
On Pitkin’s account, the representative must consider her constituents’ wishes, 
and be “responsive to” them.51 Nevertheless, the representative’s ultimate 
obligation is to do what is good for her constituents, not to follow their every 
wish.52 Decisions that deviate from public preferences are permissible, but they 
must be capable of justification in terms of the public interest.53 
As applied to adjudication, this model suggests that we can identify 
challenges for representation in areas where, for example, meaningful 
accountability appears to be lacking. Failures of accountability could occur for 
various reasons. Information is critical to political accountability—information 
from members of the public about our experiences and wishes, and information 
to the public about what government is doing on our behalf.54 A lack of 
 
48 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1, 38-41 (1975) (discussing the causes and effects of discretionary nonenforcement by public 
enforcers). 
49 See Lemos, supra note 43, at 41-42. 
50 See supra note 20. 
51 PITKIN, supra note 1, at 162; see also MANIN, supra note 20, at 170 (“Representatives are not 
required to act on the wishes of the people, but neither can they ignore them . . . . It is the 
representatives who make the final decisions, but a framework is created in which the will of the 
people is one of the considerations in their decision process.”). 
52 PITKIN, supra note 1, at 162. 
53 Id. at 163-64; see also Rehfield, supra note 4, at 214 (“[W]e must always justify and explain 
cases in which law deviates from citizen preferences.”). 
54 MULGAN, supra note 44, at 9 (“Forcing people to explain what they have done is perhaps 
the essential component of making them accountable . . . . [T]he core of accountability becomes a 
dialogue between accountors and account-holders, using a shared ‘language of justification.’”); 
Waldron, supra note 44 (arguing that “it goes to the essence of the political relationship . . . for the 
people to demand an account [from government]”). 
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transparency about enforcement policy should therefore be cause for concern 
under the political model of representation. And, because accountability to the 
public is different from accountability to narrow special interests, the same is 
true of institutional structures that permit those interests to exercise outsized 
influence over government litigation.55 
We can also predict certain consequences of the political model of adjudicative 
representation. Put simply, it will be political. The objectives of government 
litigation will change with presidential or gubernatorial administrations, or (in 
most states) with attorney general elections, or with shifts in control of the 
legislatures, which control the purse strings. The Taxman case illustrates the 
point. The Department of Justice did in fact initiate the litigation during the 
George H.W. Bush Administration. As the attorney for the Piscataway Board of 
Education later related, the Bush administration had been “looking for a test case 
to press its conservative affirmative action agenda in the federal courts,” and 
Taxman seemed like a perfect vehicle.56 The government won in the district court, 
but it had changed its tune by the time the case reached the Third Circuit. The 
DOJ withdrew as a party to the case57 and sought to file a brief as amicus curiae 
on behalf of the defendant board.58 The reason was a change in administration: 
with Clinton’s election in 1992, the politics of affirmative action had shifted. For 
years, Democrats had argued in favor of measures designed to remedy past 
discrimination, but many had shied away from explicit endorsements of 
affirmative action. The Clinton Administration was the first to support 
affirmative action fully. And the new head of the Civil Rights Division—Deval 
Patrick, a former attorney for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund—decided the 
government should switch sides in the Taxman case.59 
Critics of affirmative action were shocked—shocked!—by the DOJ’s 
about-face. Charles Fried, who had been Solicitor General under President 
Reagan, said “[i]t strikes me as naked politics and transparent and wrong. Just 
wrong.”60 Others raised ethical questions about the propriety of the 
government’s working closely and confidentially with Taxman and her 
attorney at the trial level and then coming out against her position on 
appeal.61 For his part, Patrick insisted that he and his staff had carefully 
considered the ethical questions before committing to the new position. “We 
 
55 I discuss these and other challenges for government litigation at length in Lemos, supra note 
43, at 29-52. 
56 David B. Rubin, Courtus Interruptus: One Lawyer’s Experience in the Life of the Law, N.J. LAW., 
Apr. 2003, at 28, 28. 
57 Because Taxman had intervened as a plaintiff at the trial level, the dispute remained live. 
58 See Iver Peterson, Justice Dept. Switches Sides in Racial Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1994, at A37. 
59 See Terry Eastland, They Went Piscataway, THE AM. SPECTATOR, Apr. 1997, at 64, 64-65. 
60 Peterson, supra note 58. 
61 Id. 
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never represented Mrs. Taxman,” Patrick explained. “We represent the 
interests of the United States.”62 As that statement suggests, the interests that 
the government serves in adjudication will include the interests of 
defendants—or, at least, interests that are antagonistic to those of plaintiffs 
in equivalent private suits. That, too, is a consequence of the political model 
of adjudicative representation. 
III. THE COLLECTIVE MODEL: ATTORNEYS IN AGGREGATE 
LITIGATION 
The individual model of adjudication focuses on the client’s interests in 
isolation, while the political model takes account of interests on all sides of 
every issue. One might be tempted to complain, Goldilocks-style, that the 
first perspective is too narrow and the second too broad. An adjudicative 
model in which similarly situated individuals are able to secure an attorney 
to represent their collective interests might then seem just right. I will call this 
the “collective model” of adjudicative representation. Its clearest 
manifestation, of course, is in the private class action. 
Class actions represent a break from the “day in court” ideal, because all 
of the interested individuals do not actually participate in the adjudication 
themselves—and yet they are bound by the judgment.63 Representation is 
baked into the class-action system for reasons both legal and practical. As a 
practical matter, as interested parties proliferate, it becomes infeasible for 
each to speak for herself; the Court’s observations in Bi-Metallic about the 
necessity of representation in the context of lawmaking begin to make sense 
for adjudication as well. Representation is required as a legal matter, too: an 
individual who did not participate directly in an adjudication may be bound 
by the judgment only if her interests were “adequately represented.”64 
Despite its manifest importance, we lack a satisfying model of collective 
adjudicative representation. As class-action scholars have noted, problems of 
authorization and accountability loom large here. The notion that opt-out 
rights in damages class actions promote meaningful accountability and a kind 
of post-hoc authorization is debatable, to say the least.65 And members of 
 
62 Tim O’Brien, Pushing the Race Button, N.J.L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 261. 265. 
63 See Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2002) (“A class action is simply, when all else is stripped away, a 
state-created procedural device for extinguishing claims of individuals held at quite a distance from 
the ‘day in court’ ideal of Anglo-American jurisprudence.”). 
64 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2008). Cf. Fiss, supra note 7, at 25 (“[T]o be precise, 
the legal system does not guarantee that every person will have a day in court, but only that the 
interest of each person will be represented in court.”). 
65 See, e.g., David Marcus, Flawed But Noble: Desegregation Litigation and its Implications for the 
Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 663 n.22 (2011) (noting that the “consent-based 
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“mandatory” injunctive classes—my focus here—have no opt-out rights at 
all.66 That is so notwithstanding the fact that divisions within the class as to 
the proper objectives of the litigation are “particularly likely” in injunctive 
class actions.67 
When we get to the element of interest representation, moreover, the 
collective-representation model seems to veer from the individual model’s 
instructed delegate to the other extreme of a wholly independent, 
“enlightened trustee.” As Stephen Yeazell has observed, Rule 23 appears to 
adopt a Burkean approach to representation.68 Burke famously told his 
constituents that, instead of obeying their instructions, he “conformed to the 
instructions of truth and nature” and “maintained [their] interest even against 
[their] opinions.”69 Burkean representation is notoriously elitist, justifying 
the independence of the representative by reference to his superior wisdom 
and knowledge.70 It understands “interests” as abstract and objective, matters 
of “truth and nature” rather than opinion or feeling. The representative’s duty 
is to do what he thinks is best for the represented, even if they insist that they 
want something else. 
The Burkean conception of interests, and of representation, is hard to 
swallow in today’s world.71 As Pitkin argued, “for most representation 
theorists since Burke’s time, political questions are inevitably controversial 
ones without a right answer.”72 The same is true of many legal questions. 
Return once more to the Taxman example.73 Most lawyers, I suspect, would 
contend that there are better and worse—if not right and wrong—answers to 
 
justification for notice and opt-out rights is quite weak” and citing critics); see also Theodore 
Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical 
and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1561 (2004) (“The overwhelming inaction displayed by 
class members in the reported cases suggests that a class member’s failure to opt out should not 
readily be equated to an affirmative consent to jurisdiction.”). 
66 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). 
67 See Rhode, supra note 15, at 1184 (emphasizing that “the often indeterminate quality of relief 
available makes conflicts within plaintiff classes particularly likely”); Yeazell, supra note 14, at 1110 
(observing that Rule 23 dispenses with consent in injunctive actions, where “the coincidence of 
interests is most debatable”). Cf. Southworth, supra note 18, at 2454 (noting that “injunctive class 
action litigation almost always raises difficult problems of accountability”). 
68 See Yeazell, supra note 14, at 1069; see generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE 
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1790); EDMUND BURKE, THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF THE 
PRESENT DISCONTENTS (1770). 
69 PITKIN, supra note 1, at 176 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
70 See Jane Mansbridge, Clarifying the Concept of Representation, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 621, 
623 (2011) (“[T]he concept of a trustee, particularly a Burkean trustee, implies a hierarchy in which 
the representative has more wisdom, intelligence, or prudence than the voter.”). 
71 Yeazell, supra note 14, at 1069 (emphasizing the divergence between “political and litigative 
definitions of legitimate representation” and noting that “[g]roup litigation established itself on a 
concept of abstract interest representation just as that concept was rejected in political life”). 
72 PITKIN, supra note 1, at 189. 
73 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996); see generally supra text accompanying notes 56–62. 
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the question of whether Taxman was subjected to unlawful racial 
discrimination. At the same time, though, most of us would anticipate that 
different judges might resolve the question differently; we would concede 
that reasonable minds might disagree. Now, perhaps we would still insist that 
the question is one for lawyers only, that the views of the people affected by 
the Piscataway affirmative action policy and others like it are irrelevant. 
Perhaps the elitism of Burkean representation would feel more appropriate 
in legal circles than in political ones. But my guess is that many of us would 
balk at the suggestion that questions of law should be decided in such a sterile, 
technical environment, sealed off from considerations of their consequences. 
If the Taxman example doesn’t give pause, consider Derrick Bell’s critique of 
school-desegregation litigation, which was opposed by many African-American 
families who thought that school quality, rather than integration, should be the 
goal of race-discrimination lawsuits.74 Bell’s account calls attention to the 
potential for divergent views among class members, not just on what the law 
requires but on what to do about it.75 Like questions of whether to sue in the 
first place, questions of remedy are rarely clear-cut and objective.76 Their 
answers may not be wholly subjective, but neither do they appear to be matters 
of truth and nature.77 To the extent that is true, it becomes uncomfortable to 
ignore the preferences of the individuals with the most at stake. 
Nevertheless, a Burkean approach might be necessary, as a practical 
matter, in order to sustain the class action device. Recall that the individual 
model of adjudicative representation understands interests as subjective, akin 
to wishes or desires. Such an understanding of “interest” would make 
collective representation all but impossible, at least in the absence of 
affirmative consent by each class member.78 The collective model of 
representation that Rule 23(b)(2) entails—with no opt-out rights, much less 
opt-in rights—is coherent only if one conceives of interests in more objective 
terms, analogous to the goals embodied in substantive law. 
Under the collective model of adjudicative representation, then, we can 
identify challenges to representation by reference to outcomes, rather than by 
parsing the interactions between represented and representative.79 A 
 
74 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 505-11 (1976). 
75 See, e.g., id. at 507 (noting that “many black parents oppose total reliance on racial balance 
remedies to cure the effects of school segregation”). 
76 See Rhode, supra note 15, at 1188-91 (discussing intraclass conflicts over remedy). 
77 Yeazell, supra note 14, at 1069. 
78 See id. at 1103 (“If . . . the validity of a class depends on the subjective desire of the 
individuals constituting it  . . . classes could consist only of volunteers.”). 
79 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for Aggregate 
Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 583 (2010) (“Adjudication’s close connection 
to substantive law means there is an independent metric for evaluating outcome quality—namely, how 
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representative has done well if she has helped to vindicate the “fundamental 
values dictated by substantive law”; if not, she has done poorly.80 
Similarly, a consequence of the collective model is that the preferences of 
class members do not control. Indeed, they may not even be relevant.81 Under 
the collective model, we do not ask whether class members actually want the 
outcome that the litigation will yield; we ask only whether that outcome is 
“congruent with the policy of the underlying substantive law.”82 We “blind[] 
ourselves to the variety and arbitrariness of individual desires”83 and fall back 
on the response that Part I considered and rejected as inconsistent with the 
individual model: the law is the law. 
There are good reasons for this concession to formalism. Class actions serve 
important purposes in our legal system, empowering so-called “private attorneys 
general” to vindicate legal rights on behalf of groups that may lack the 
organization—or the resources—to protect their interests. It bears emphasis, 
moreover, that in many cases involving injunctions or other forms of structural 
relief, an individual suit by one person could produce the same result as a class 
action, but with no consideration of third-party interests whatsoever.84 That 
hardly seems like an improvement; a little representation is better than none. 
Still, for some observers, this is not good enough. These commentators 
search for procedural mechanisms to make class actions more “democratic,” 
to take account of individual preferences in some way.85 For example, 
Deborah Rhode argues for “full disclosure of, although not necessarily 
deference to, class sentiment.”86 And Bill Rubenstein suggests “[r]ules that 
 
closely the outcome fits the parties’ substantive entitlements. Thus, features of process design, such as 
adequate representation, are not necessary to an outcome-based theory.”); Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking 
Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2008) (arguing that “[r]epresentation by class 
representatives and counsel is adequate if, and only if, the representation makes class members no worse 
off than they would have been had they engaged in individual litigation”). 
80 Yeazell, supra note 14, at 1116 (offering the example of a settlement in a hypothetical sex 
discrimination case that “does not address the acts giving rise to liability, but instead proposes greatly 
increased funding for a Women’s Studies Center at the university”). 
81 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 65, at 690 (“Judges [in school-desegregation litigation] dealt with 
the problem of conflicts in litigant preferences among class members by denying their relevance. Really 
at stake, they reasoned, were group rights, and individuals did not matter all that much.”). 
82 Yeazell, supra note 14, at 1117. 
83 Id. at 1119. 
84 See Rhode, supra note 15, at 1195
 
(“Regardless of how the action is denominated, a finding of 
liability typically triggers class-wide relief and class-wide concerns. Most institutional reform 
lawsuits now filed as class actions could also proceed as personal claims. Denying certification would 
often introduce all the inefficiencies attending individual suits, without necessarily restricting the 
scope of the ultimate decree.”). 
85 See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 1626 (“Community member disputes concerning the 
goals of litigation are inherently political in nature and therefore call for more democratic forms of 
decisionmaking. . . .”). 
86 Rhode, supra note 15, at 1185. 
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require[] individuals or experts filing group-based cases to demonstrate that 
some level of community dialogue preceded the decision to file, or to show 
some level of community participation in the filing, or to establish approval 
for their filings from democratically elected representatives. . . .”87 
Thinking about these issues from the perspective of political theory 
suggests a complementary line of inquiry, one that extends beyond the 
immediate case. As noted above, one of the most jarring features of 
representation under the collective model is the lack of authorization and 
accountability—a feature that sharply distinguishes collective representation, 
not only from the individual model of adjudicative representation, but from 
the standard account of political representation as well.88 Yet political 
theorists today are increasingly moving away from, or at least beyond, that 
standard account. Recognizing the increasing complexity of modern 
governance and the waning relevance of geographical (and thus electoral) 
lines of division, these theorists are exploring alternative bases for 
legitimizing representation in the absence of conventional forms of 
authorization and accountability.89 
Of particular relevance here are theories that try to make sense of “self-
appointed representatives”—representatives who are never elected or otherwise 
formally selected by those they claim to represent.90 Perhaps the most common 
examples of self-appointed representatives are nonprofit organizations, which 
uses various strategies, including both political and legal advocacy, to advance the 
interests of particular groups. Such organizations need money and other 
resources in order to survive, and they will not be effective unless their claim to 
representation is widely recognized as valid. In an important sense, then, 
nonprofits are accountable—to those who support and validate them.91 
 
87 Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 1659. 
88 Cf. Fiss, supra note 7, at 25 (noting that class actions entail self-appointed representatives 
and that “[s]elf-appointment . . . is an anomalous form of representation, only justified, if at all, by 
the most exceptional circumstances”). 
89 See generally Urbinati & Warren, supra note 20, at 388 (reviewing “the concept of 
representation from the perspective of recent democratic theory”). 
90 See generally Laura Montanaro, The Democratic Legitimacy of Self-Appointed Representatives, 74 
J. POL. 1094 (2012); see also Mansbridge, supra note 3, at 522 (defining “[s]urrogate representation” 
as “representation by a representative with whom one has no electoral relationship—that is, a 
representative in another district”); Michael Saward, Authorisation and Authenticity: Representation 
and the Unelected, 17 J. POL. PHILOSOPHY 1, 2 (2009) (arguing that Mansbridge’s “notion of 
surrogacy can be usefully extended to include actors who are not elected at all”). 
91 See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 1668 (“[P]rofessional civil rights attorneys are often 
the only attorneys who are actually appointed by and answerable to their communities.”); see also 
Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative 
Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 226 n.26 (1990) (reviewing STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM 
MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1997)) (“[T]he need to finance 
civil rights litigation through voluntary contributions forced litigating representatives, such as the 
NAACP, to forge a classwide fundraising organization and thus to take account of the litigation 
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Political scientist Laura Montanaro uses the term “authorizing 
constituency” to refer to “those empowered to exercise authorization [of] and 
demand accountability” from the representative through their contributions 
of money, time, or rhetorical support.92 For Montanaro, self-appointed 
representation is “democratic” when the authorizing constituency has 
significant overlap with what she calls the “affected constituency”—the 
individuals whose interests will be affected by the representative’s work.93 
This understanding of self-appointed representation has interesting 
implications for adjudication. As Montanaro and others have argued in recent 
work, self-appointed representatives can be “particularly useful politically 
when they provide representation for peoples whose interests are affected by 
policies but who are not situated within electoral constituencies that can 
determine those policies.”94 This may be true when affected communities spill 
over electoral lines, or comprise a persistent political minority. In legal circles, 
adjudication is recognized as an important outlet for such groups: as the 
Supreme Court noted in NAACP v. Button, “[g]roups which find themselves 
unable to achieve their objectives by the ballot frequently turn to the 
courts. . . . For such a group, association for litigation may be the most 
effective form of political association.”95 
Legal advocacy organizations like the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund are 
frequent players in injunctive class actions. They are also archetypal self-appointed 
representatives. Montanaro’s theory suggests that the legitimacy of their 
representation turns on their ongoing relationships with the “affected 
constituencies”—the constituencies whose interests they purport to represent in 
litigation—not merely (or even especially) their conduct in any given case. 
This broader perspective on the representational relationship is consistent 
with the nature of legal public interest work. Legal advocacy organizations 
rarely devote themselves exclusively to litigation.96 Litigation is typically part 
 
preferences of class members. The existence of this group organization helped ensure adequate 
representation through accountability . . . .”). But see infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text 
(describing the disconnect that often occurs between those funding legal advocacy organizations and 
those benefitting from the organizations’ services). 
92 Montanaro, supra note 90, at 1096, 1099. 
93 Id. at 1095. 
94 Id. at 1094; see also Mansbridge, supra note 3, at 523 (arguing that “[s]urrogate representation, 
both state- and nation-wide, plays the normatively critical role of providing representation to voters 
who lose in their own district”); Saward, supra note 90, at 2 (“[E]lections can, in some circumstances, 
act to restrict the nature and range of representative perspectives and voices, and . . . these 
restrictions can be democratically troubling.”). 
95 371 U.S. 415, 429-31 (1963). 
96 Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027, 
2043 (2007) (“It is, as surveyed leaders [of public interest law organizations] generally recognized, 
impossible to ‘create policy,’ ‘change attitudes’ or ‘build a movement’ solely through litigation.”). 
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of a larger, multipronged strategy of social and legal change.97 Where that is 
true, assessing the legitimacy of representation by focusing only on opportunities 
for constituents to participate in specific cases risks missing the forest for the 
trees. Because policy decisions inevitably involve tradeoffs, and because their full 
consequences are often not visible immediately or in isolation, we tend to gauge 
the adequacy of political representatives based on their conduct over the long 
term. Rule 23’s provisions demand more short-term, case-based assessments of 
adjudicative representation, and commentators understandably have focused on 
those questions. But to say that case-based evaluation is necessary is not to say 
that it is sufficient. At the very least, those of us who are inclined to view 
litigation—especially impact litigation—through a political lens need not be so 
confined. 
In addition to expanding the relevant frame of inquiry, thinking about 
legal advocacy organizations as self-appointed representatives also highlights 
the importance of funding. For self-appointed representatives, accountability 
often will stem largely from financial contributions.98 One consequence is 
that there may be very little overlap between the “authorizing” and “affected” 
communities, particularly where the latter suffers from social and structural 
disadvantage—as will often be the case in public interest litigation. Legal 
advocacy organizations are highly dependent on outside funding,99 and donor 
preferences can help shape their initiatives and objectives.100 Yet funding for 
public interest litigation remains something of a black box: we know it 
matters, but we have very little systematic data on where it comes from, or 
 
97 Id. 
98 See Montanaro, supra note 90, at 1101 (“Authorizing constituencies derive their capacity to 
authorize from the resources—as examples, money and status—they can offer the self-appointed 
representative. These resources may produce, reproduce, and even exacerbate inequalities between 
the authorizing constituency and the affected constituency . . . .”); cf. Mansbridge, supra note 3, at 
523 (“Because all the power that is exercised in any surrogate representation works through monetary 
or other contributions and through contributors rather than voters, surrogate representation in the 
United States today embodies far more political inequality than does even the traditional legislator-
constituent relation.”). 
99 See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN 
CLASS ACTION 93, 263 (1987) (noting that organizations in the public-interest bar “share a common 
characteristic: all depend on fund-raising for a substantial part of their operating expenses” and that 
“the real check” on representatives in collective public interest litigation “lies in the unstated 
requirement that the organization raise enough funds from either public or private sources to finance 
the litigation”). 
100 See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights From 
Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 605 (2009) (“[M]oney matters: how public interest 
law is financed affects the kinds of cases that can be pursued and their likely social impact. A deeper 
understanding of financial constraints and opportunities in different practice contexts is therefore 
critical to effective reform.”); see also Rhode, supra note 96, at 2052 (finding that nearly two-fifths of 
public interest law organizations reported that funders have a moderate impact on priorities). 
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what drives it.101 Filling in those blanks will not be easy, but it is critical to 
understanding the accountability relationships—or lack thereof—that shape 
adjudicative representation.102 
CONCLUSION 
This short Article has offered a sketch of three different models of 
adjudicative representation. Whether one focuses on authorization, 
accountability, or interest representation, one finds different answers 
depending on context. That diversity is, in itself, striking. Among other 
things, it reflects our legal system’s ambivalence about the nature of legal 
entitlements, and about the lines between “public” and “private”—or 
“individual” and “group”—rights. 
Reflecting on the multifaceted nature of adjudicative representation also 
highlights the benefits of thinking about different litigation devices in 
comparative terms. Scholarship on class actions often compares and contrasts 
collective and individual litigation. Yet most such efforts focus on defending 
one of the forms against the other. What I have in mind here is a more 
contextual assessment of comparative competence, so to speak. As is true of 
different models of political representation, each model of adjudicative 
representation “generates a set of normative criteria by which it can be 
judged.”103 Theorizing representation therefore allows us, not only to assess 
the quality of representation in different settings, but also to think through 
the relative advantages or disadvantages of each type. We might ask, for 
example, in what circumstances the objective conception of legal interests 
that we find in the class-action contexts makes the most—and least—sense. 
We might take up Bill Rubenstein’s suggestion that “certain cases be [required 
to] be filed in class action-like form,”104 and spend more time on the question 
of which kind. Or, we might seek to develop theories about the types of cases 
in which government litigation works as an effective (or even superior) 
substitute for private action, and the cases in which the government’s 




101 Cf. Rhode, supra note 96, at 2054 (offering statistics on relative rates of funding by 
foundations, individuals, etc. and showing that an overwhelming majority of nonprofits receive 
foundation funding). 
102 Id. at 2057 (flagging “broader issues about strategic philanthropy [and its consequences for 
public interest legal work] that deserve further research”). 
103 Mansbridge, supra note 3, at 515. 
104 Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 1669. 
